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This paper considers what is at stake in telling the story of another’s illness and 
in taking on the history of another’s dementia as part of one’s own life 
narrative. Through a close analysis of Michael Ignatieff’s Scar Tissue, it 
explores the ways in which writing about the experience of caring for a parent 
with dementia speaks to the intersubjective dimensions of selfhood but also 
complicates the ways in which the very concept of intersubjectivity is often 
evoked within scholarship on personhood. It argues that an engagement with 
this kind of narrative is illuminating in this context because it exposes some of 
the emotional, memorial, and ethical difficulties that attend the experience of 
writing for and about another person when he or she is no longer able to do so. 
 
 
Introduction: Oneself as Another 
 
Monday 25 
We waited in the emergency room for two hours, with my mother 
lying on a stretcher. She wet herself. A young man had tried to 
commit suicide by taking pills. We went into the examination 
room and they laid my mother down on a table. The intern rolled 
up her chemise to reveal her stomach—the thighs, the white 
vagina, a few stretch marks. Suddenly, I felt I was the one who 
was being exposed in public. 
 
                                                        
1   I would like to acknowledge the support of the Arts and Humanities Research Council 
UK (research leave scheme) in facilitating the research for this paper. 
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I thought back to the cat who had died when I was fifteen; she had 
urinated on my pillow before dying. And the blood and bodily 
fluids I had lost just before my abortion twenty years ago. 
(Ernaux, 2000, p. 15)  
 
There are many things to say about Annie Ernaux’s description of 
the treatment of her mother on her admission to hospital. The literal 
stripping of her mother’s dignity by the nameless intern offers a painful 
account of her powerlessness and loss of autonomy in the face of an over-
stretched emergency department. One recalls Michel Foucault’s (2003) 
description of the modern medical gaze in The Birth of The Clinic, in 
which “in relation to that which he is suffering from, the patient is only an 
external fact; the medical reading must take him into account only to 
place him in parentheses” (p. 8). Her mother is produced by this medical 
encounter as an aged, leaking, and malfunctioning body: passive, to be 
“laid out” and “worked upon.” Her lack of bodily control bespeaks a loss 
of personal and social control over her situation and her treatment. She is 
cast here as the denuded, empty body of Alzheimer’s, a living corpse. The 
de-realization of her personhood is nowhere so clearly signaled as in the 
comparison to the incontinent, dying cat.  
Ernaux’s description of her mother’s exposure is ineradicably 
marked by gender. Rolling up her chemise to reveal a “white vagina,” it is 
the signs of her motherhood that are noted: her stomach indelibly tattooed 
with the stretch marks of pregnancy. The shame of this unveiling reminds 
Ernaux of “the blood and bodily fluids” of her own earlier abortion. Her 
empathy with her mother is thus forged through the recognition of the 
bodily violations of pregnancy and abortion, and of their mutual 
vulnerability in these contexts, of their shared experiences as women.  
Yet this is a troubling form of empathy, isn’t it? To what extent 
does the text itself reproduce the violence that marks this medical 
encounter, by readmitting Ernaux’s mother to the hospital and subjecting 
her this time to the critical and pathologising gaze of the reading public? 
Isn’t it Ernaux who plays the intern in this textual scenario, removing her 
mother’s clothes, unmasking her for a second time? Certainly in doing so, 
she also re-enacts the violence she experiences herself, in recalling her 
sense of public exposure and in the revelation of her abortion. This is 
brought to light through her narrative recollection. Second time around, 
not one but both women are exposed to public scrutiny, unmasked. The 
narrative rends the veil that separates a set of deeply intimate experiences 
—abortion, child birth, loss of bodily control, dying—from the public 
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gaze. As readers, we are taken into the emergency room and confronted 
with the exposure of both women.  
Writing of the experience of oneself as existentially separate and 
alone, Arthur Frank (1995) notes that modern medicine “encourages 
monadic bodies in many ways” (p. 36). It does so institutionally in the 
arrangement of space on wards and in waiting rooms where we sit, staring 
straight ahead, avoiding eye contact, bags defensively lodged on our laps 
as if contact might be infectious or ill-omened. It also does so 
discursively in terms of the disease model that speaks to pathological 
signs and symptoms rather than to the whole person. Yet the experience 
of illness itself is often shared, reaching beyond the bodies of ill persons 
to saturate the lifeworld of those around them (Kleinman, 1988). And this 
is what we see in Ernaux’s description. In the face of the casual disregard 
shown to her mother as a consequence of her dementia, she asserts a 
shared, intersubjective experience in the recognition of her own shame in 
that of her mother’s loss of bodily control. Her account of this scene 
deliberately disturbs the usual distinctions between self and other, patient 
and carer, mother and daughter. To borrow John Wiltshire’s (2000) 
phrase, it as if the narrative initiates a kind of “devolution of one selfhood 
into another” (p. 409). 
Sharon Kaufman (2006) describes Alzheimer’s disease as 
“problematising the subject in an unprecedented manner” (p. 23). She is 
referring here to the centrality of Alzheimer’s dementia to current 
bioethical and cultural debates around the value and the limits of 
meaningful life. Yet in familial and emotional terms, it is true also to say 
that Alzheimer’s problematizes inter-subjectivity in an equally 
unprecedented manner, in that it raises inescapable questions about the 
way we conceptualise the boundaries between self and other and about 
the ethical dimensions of memorial practices in this context. What, in 
other words, is at stake in telling the story of another’s illness and in 
taking on the history of this illness as part of one’s own life narrative? 
Reading Ernaux’s memoir, it is difficult not to feel some ethical unease 
about the relationship between the violations of the medical examination 
and those of memorial revelation. If privacy, as Jeffrey Reiman (1976) 
argues, is “a precondition of personhood” (p. 26), then surely the writing 
and indeed the reading of this description can be construed as a violation 
of Ernaux’s mother’s personhood. To the degree, then, that this piece 
asserts a shared, intersubjective experience in Ernaux’s recognition of her 
own pain and shame in that of her mother’s, the description of this scene 
also enacts a form of discursive violence upon her mother’s now silent 
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body, and a more complex and troubling dynamic between mother and 
daughter.  
The “Alzheimer’s epidemic” of the last twenty years has produced 
a significant body of writing by the children of those with the disease.
2
 
These “filial memoirs” (Couser, 2009) construct the narrative of the 
illness experience in the context of the relationship between parent and 
child, and in relation to the perceived continuities and discontinuities of 
identity pre- and post-illness (Couser, 2009). Characteristically, the 
narrator’s relationship to the disease, and to the ill person, is experienced 
as a kind of trauma that disrupts his or her own sense of identity. For 
instance, Sue Miller (2004), in her account of her father’s final years with 
Alzheimer’s disease, describes herself as “altered … in some of the very 
same ways” as her father is by his illness: “made bland and callous, 
reduced” (p. 137). This is typical of the form. The illness narrative, as 
Wiltshire (1998) puts it, characteristically suggests that “being a care-
giver or relative, as well as a patient, is to be in a state of impaired, and 
contingent, subjectivity” (p. 197).  
In relation to the contemporary experience of an Alzheimer’s 
diagnosis, this sense of impaired and contingent subjectivity is 
particularly intense. The impact of dementia upon memory, cognition, 
mood and behaviour makes an engagement with questions of the meaning 
and definition of personhood unavoidable. More particularly, recognition 
of the genetic components of the disease disturbs the conventional 
meanings of heritage, and any straightforward embracing of one’s 
familial history, as that which nurtures and sustains particular kinds of 
identity (Burke, 2008). That one may inherit more than stories, culture, 
and disposition from one’s parents is a recurrent theme in these memoirs. 
Ways of living become ways of dying. Genealogical heritage recast in 
genetic terms becomes a curse, the site of the undoing of identity as much 
as its foundation. Children are compelled to confront the possibility of 
their own cognitive and memory losses in those of their parents. The 
fiction of an inviolable or unitary identity is disturbed not simply in the 
organic damage wrought by the disease itself but in the dislocation of 
familial relationships that occurs when parents cease to recognise their 
own children and children are forced to re-orient their own sense of self 
in the face of this violation of foundational intersubjective relationships.  
                                                        
2 I use “Alzheimer’s” here and throughout in recognition of the powerful effects of the 
biomedicalisation of dementia and the emergence of Alzheimer’s disease as the 
dominant category in relation to which dementia is popularly understood and arguably 
experienced.  
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To write of illness, in this instance, is far more than simply an act of 
writing back to the imperialising agenda of modern medicine, as Arthur 
Frank (1995) has described it. It is more complex, too, than simply a form 
of narrative reparation or compensation, although the impulse to make 
sense of what is often presented as an un-assimilable experience through 
writing is strong.
3
 “Why do you think that writing about it will make any 
difference?” asks the wife of the narrator of Michael Ignatieff’s (1994) 
Scar Tissue. Because “I need to do something, anything” is the reply (p. 
8). Lives and selves become entangled in these Alzheimer’s memoirs—to 
write of another is necessarily to write of oneself. And this is an 
ambivalent undertaking: less an act of healing than a form of mourning, 
less an act of self-realisation than an elegiac reflection upon the fragility 
of all identity and its undoing. My aim, then, in this essay is to argue for 
the significance of this body of writing in relation to the ways we 
understand the meanings of intersubjectivity in the context of writing 
about dementia. I am thinking here particularly about the centrality of 
models of intersubjectivity and relational identity to the discourses of the 
personhood movement in dementia and its focus upon the ethical 
importance of the shared authorship of life narratives. I want to argue that 
an engagement with the literature of the Alzheimer’s epidemic is 
illuminating in this context, not only to the degree that it embodies the 
notion of relational selfhood, but also because it exposes some of the 
emotional, memorial, and ethical difficulties that attend the production of 
these narratives.  
 
Recognition and Personhood 
 
The concept of intersubjectivity, of the ways in which we come into 
being through the mutual recognition of another, is the central tenet of 
numerous ethical projects. We find various versions of the concept 
developed across the fields of social theory (Habermasian communicative 
ethics), moral philosophy (Emmanuel Levinas’s Zwischen and Martin 
Buber’s I-thou), psychology and psychoanalysis (Maurice Merleau-
Ponty’s concept of perception, Jessica Benjamin’s account of 
recognition), philosophy of language (Mikhail Bakhtin’s theory of 
dialogism) and narrative theory (Paul Ricoeur’s formulation of narrative 
identity). This list is hardly exhaustive—clearly, there are many more 
                                                        
3 For a discussion of the characteristics of “filial memoirs”—specifically, the endeavour 
to compensate for the lost object in the shape of a distant parent—see Couser (2012, 
p.155). 
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people whose work I could cite, and these disciplinary attributions 
themselves are permeable precisely because of the centrality of the idea 
of the intersubjective realm to this body of work. All these theorists 
develop models in which subjectivity is predicated upon an encounter 
with another and in which a properly ethical identification is borne of 
shared recognition. As Benjamin (1988) puts it: 
 
The intersubjective view maintains that the individual grows in 
and through the relationship to other subjects. Most important, this 
perspective observes that the other whom the self meets is also a 
self, a subject in his or her own right. It assumes that we are able 
and need to recognize that other subject as different and yet alike, 
as another who is capable of sharing similar mental experience. 
Thus the idea of intersubjectivity reorients the conception of the 
psychic world from a subject’s relations to its object toward a 
subject meeting another subject. (pp. 19-20) 
 
The emphasis here upon “meeting” recalls Martin Buber’s (1937/2004) 
observation that “All real living is meeting” (p. 11). What Benjamin 
means is not simply any kind of encounter, but one which is open and 
alive to the feelings, actions, and intentions of both self and other: “such 
recognition can only come from another whom we, in turn, recognize as a 
person in his or her own right” (p. 12). 
It is this sense of our essential connectedness to others that is 
placed in parentheses in prevailing biomedical models of dementia and in 
neuroscientific discourses that seek to locate increasingly subtle personal 
behaviours and dispositions in various chemical interactions and electrical 
impulses in the brain. The search to establish different types of brains 
(depressed, autistic, schizophrenic, demented) is redolent of the 
nineteenth century pathologisation of sexuality in which particular 
behaviours became ontological categories. As many scholars have argued, 
this kind of discourse produces rather than simply reflects an ill or 
disabled body, and it speaks to this body in isolation as if the meanings of 
disease are reducible to the functioning (or otherwise) of the grey and 
white matter enclosed within our skulls. 
In the specific case of dementia, the focus upon the pathology of 
cognitive decline and upon the enumeration of various forms of deficit 
feeds into the strand of bioethical thought that Theodore Fleischer (1999) 
terms “personalism” (p. 309). Here, “a human being achieves a claim to 
life and medical resources only if he possesses certain capacities, 
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primarily cognitive abilities and self-consciousness” (p. 309). Thus for 
personalists such as the utilitarian philosopher Peter Singer (1995), 
personhood is something that we can test for by way of an assessment of 
cognitive function and self-awareness. It is defined by the capacity to “see 
[oneself] as existing in different times and places,” by having “wants and 
plans for the future,” “rationality,” and “self-awareness” (pp. 197-98). 
There is also, he suggests, “a powerful social and political reason for 
protecting the lives of those who are capable of fearing their own death” 
(p. 218). Buttressed by increasingly sophisticated medical technologies 
for the establishment of brain function, Singer’s argument is for the 
development of a new ethics of life and death founded upon these criteria. 
Separated from bare or biological life—the mere fact of our existence— 
personhood becomes an individual property to be established and a matter 
of judgement. It is perhaps no surprise that for Singer, the judges are 
primarily medical professionals armed with a battery of diagnostic 
instruments. 
That being a person involves more than simply cognition and self-
consciousness is one of the defining arguments of the personhood 
movement in dementia care. This body of work—theoretical and 
therapeutic—emerges out of a sense of the ethical shortcomings of 
biomedical discourse and of personalism within bioethics. Both are felt to 
condemn persons with dementia prematurely to a form of biosocial death, 
removing them from the realm of meaningful social interaction (Kitwood, 
1997). The argument is that particular models of brain, mind, and person 
can lead to the perception that the person with dementia is a nonperson 
and that this, in turn, is iatrogenic, actively collusive with their 
impairment (Leibing, 2006, p. 243). Tom Kitwood (1997), for instance, 
one of the most influential voices in the personhood movement, identifies 
the ways in which particular attitudes towards dementia produce a 
“malignant social environment” that is “deeply damaging to personhood, 
possibly even undermining physical well-being” (p. 46). He develops a 
list of seventeen inter-related elements that characterise the malignant 
psychosocial environment, including labelling, infantilization, ignoring, 
stigmatization, social banishment, and objectification (p. 47). These 
modes of response, he argues, deprive persons with dementia of social 
selfhood, further disabling and disempowering them. 
In this respect, an engagement with various theoretical accounts of 
intersubjectivity has been central to the project of the personhood 
movement. Models of narrative identity in particular have been deployed 
in two main and inter-related ways. First, they have been evoked as 
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descriptive frameworks for the conceptualisation of the relationship 
between brain, mind, and person and thus for the formation of personal 
identity in an intersubjective milieu. Second, they have been used in a 
prescriptive sense as the basis for an ethical argument about good 
dementia care that points to the importance of the social environment and 
nexus of relationships in which people live (Sabat, 2001; Kitwood, 1997). 
First then, narrative theories of consciousness—as opposed to physicalist 
models that reduce mind to cognitive function—enable one to 
conceptualise identity as something that exceeds the individual. As Grant 
Gillett (2004; quoted in Hughes, Louw, and Sabat, 2006), puts it: 
 
we make discursive and narrative sense of ourselves as persons 
who live and move and have our being among others. The 
narrative is constructed out of the events that befall persons as 
detected by their information gathering systems and rendered 
meaningful by their conceptual skills. The resulting story shapes 
holistic patterns of brain activity and thereby affects the 
neurophysiological stream that constitutes the proximal effects of 
one’s doings in the world. In making sense of the world, we apply 
discursive skills and norms of judgment to what is going on in that 
stream to produce the narratives of our lives according to the 
framework we have made our own (on the basis of the kinds of 
things that normally go on around here. (p. 13)  
 
This is to suggest that the brain (the “information gathering system”) is 
part but not the whole of the story of selfhood. Jerome Bruner (1991) 
makes a very similar case when he argues that:  
 
in understanding the nature and growth of mind in any setting, we 
cannot take as our unit of analysis the isolated individual 
operating “inside his or her own skin” in a cultural vacuum. 
Rather, we must accept the view that the human mind cannot 
express its nascent powers without the enablement of the symbolic 
systems of culture. (p. 20) 
 
Both these accounts suggest that our identities are not simply interior 
properties reducible to brain function, but forged through the interaction 
of internal mental facilities and the external world of language, culture, 
and community. The brain is the organ of mindedness, but selfhood is not 
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reducible to the brain alone. Hughes, et al. (2006) describe the 
implications of these arguments as follows: 
 
The idea is that narrative … suggests the notion of our minds in 
some way reaching out into the community in order to provide the 
basis for an enduring sense of self. The idea of a narrative, that is, 
provides something public, something outside the head, even if 
connected to what might be occurring within, which can be shared 
and provide continuity beyond the necessity for the individual to 
be constantly self-conscious. (p. 15) 
 
The concept of narrative identity thus allows one to envisage the 
construction of life narratives as a shared enterprise rather than as the 
province of a monadic entity. It also erodes the distinction between inner 
and outer selves pointing to a far leakier or permeable relationship 
between the two. Both these implications are used to develop arguments 
for the extension of personhood to those with dementia. First, the 
emphasis upon the development of identity through an interactive 
engagement with an interlocutory web of cultural, social, and familial 
narratives means that all forms of identity are contingent upon others. 
This is presented by Hughes, et al. as a fact about identity and about our 
lives (p. 35). Its ramifications for those with dementia are two-fold. It is a 
reminder of their interconnection with others and their place in a network 
of accrued life narratives and familial relationships. As such, it implies 
that should a capacity to tell their own stories diminish, then it falls to 
those around the persons with dementia to sustain their narrative 
identities. Indeed Jennifer Radden and Joan Fordyce (2006), drawing 
upon Marya Schechtman’s (1996) work on characterisation identity, 
argue that this is a necessity: 
 
To turn away from the task of sustaining the characterisation 
identity of the person with dementia suggests a failure to 
acknowledge the extent that the construction of the identity before 
the illness was a product of others as well as of the person 
themselves. Consistency suggests that what was begun by others 
should be continued by them. And this point would not so readily 
be lost from sight were the distorting ideology of individualism, 
which casts each person the master of their fate and captain of 
their soul, to be replaced with more realistic collectivist 
assumptions. (p. 82) 
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Here the fact of intersubjectivity becomes an ethical prescription. That we 
lead storied lives becomes the basis for an argument about our obligation 
to continue co-authoring the life narratives of those no longer able to do 
so themselves. It is an injunction that makes of us both expert readers and 
narrators, calling upon care-givers to make sense of fragments of speech, 
gesture, and behaviour in the context of what is known of that person’s 
dispositions and “characterisation identity,” which Schechtman (1996) 
defines as “the set of characteristics each person has that make her the 
person she is” ( p. 74). I will return to this notion momentarily. 
Second, the erosion of the boundary between inner and outer that 
is enabled by a model of narrative identity is taken up by Carmelo 
Aquilina and Julian Hughes (2006) as the basis for an argument about 
embodiment that relocates selfhood from the interiority of mental space to 
the shared social milieu of bodily display. Here, they draw upon Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s (1953) deconstruction of the distinction between inner and 
outer and, specifically, his claim that “The human body is the best picture 
of the human soul” (p. 178). Their argument is that the continuation of 
outward behaviours—of gestures, facial expressions, and so on—
presupposes the continuation of an inner reality:  
 
If we think of someone with dementia we may wish to focus on 
the inner and conclude that it is missing: the inner self is dead. Or 
we may conclude that the inner self is trapped in the outer shell: 
the defective body or dysfunctional brain. … However, both 
conclusions are fatuous. In one sense, either conclusion might be 
true: we know what they are both getting at. But in a more 
important sense … a human being with dementia is first and 
foremost a human being and, as such, is capable of 
characterisation in terms of both inner and outer. They will still 
have gestures and behaviours, to which we should continue to 
react in a human way. It will then be perfectly natural to think of 
the human being as having some sort of subjectivity, but that is 
because they act in ways that fit with our shareable practices. (pp. 
153-154) 
 
Subjectivity, this passage suggests, is expressed through outer gestures 
and behaviours which are rendered meaningful in a shared social milieu. 
These bodily expressions speak of intentions and agency that point to an 
“inner reality”: “Our inner states are manifest by outer behaviour. Our 
shared understanding of outer characteristics is a prerequisite of 
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meaningful language. Outer behaviour, that is, requires shared (inner) 
understanding” (p. 154). 
Aquilina and Hughes (2006) and Radden and Fordyce (2006) 
decentre the self in order to argue for its preservation. By arguing that the 
locus of subjectivity is not simply inner mental space, but the shared, 
intersubjective realm of social space and narrativity, they are able to 
argue for the extension of personhood to those with dementia on the 
grounds of the centrality of the role of others, and of relationships, to the 
formation of subjectivity per se. Dementia is simply that which demands 
our recognition of this fact to the degree that the role of others in the 
sustenance of the self becomes more pronounced. As Tom Kitwood 
(1997) puts it: 
 
In dementia many aspects of the psyche that had, for a long time, 
been individual and “internal”, are again made over to the 
interpersonal milieu. Memory may have faded, but something of 
the past is known; identity remains intact, because others hold it in 
place; thoughts may have disappeared, but there are still 
interpersonal processes. (p. 69) 
 
Whose Narrative Is It, Anyway? 
 
These arguments foreground the development of subjectivity in an 
interpersonal milieu in which others are called upon to act as co-authors 
or co-constructors of the identity of the person with dementia. We can see 
here the affinity between this narrative project and that of the dominant 
mode of Alzheimer’s memoir in which children take on precisely this 
kind of role as narrators of their parent’s illness experience. What 
characterises this body of writing, however, is a sense of the profound 
difficulties that attend such a calling. These difficulties are inextricably 
tied to the epistemological ruptures of dementia—the disturbances of 
memory and of identity that define the condition. Here, intersubjectivity 
as the concept that potentially salvages and preserves the identity of the 
person with dementia is also that which also stands in its way. I refer here 
specifically to the issue of recognition and to the notion of 
intersubjectivity as a “subject meeting another subject” (Benjamin, 1988). 
Largely unarticulated in the discourses of the personhood movement to 
which I’ve referred, one of the difficulties that resonates through 
Alzheimer’s life writing is the collapse of mutual recognition wherein the 
identities of both parties are thrown into crisis by the failure of one to 
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recognise the other. When Linda Grant (1998) asks in the title of her book 
about her mother’s dementia, Remind Me Who I am, Again?, it is 
precisely the capacity of Alzheimer’s to unsettle the identities of both 
persons with dementia and those around them of which she speaks. If we 
are to understand intersubjectivity as a concept that speaks to a reciprocal 
need for recognition on the part of parent and child, then it is precisely the 
impossibility of reciprocal identification that haunts these texts as a crisis 
of identity for both parties. This is something I will trace through a close 
analysis of Michael Ignatieff’s (1993) Scar Tissue, a text that offers one 
of the most sustained and complex reflections upon dementia and 
intersubjective recognition.  
 
Oneself as Another II 
 
Although it is presented as a novel, Scar Tissue draws heavily 
upon Ignatieff’s own experience of losing his mother to Alzheimer’s and 
offers an uncompromising, if not pathological, perspective upon the 
impact of the disease upon the identities of both the person with dementia 
and those around her.
4
 Indeed, I’ve chosen to focus on this text not 
because it is straightforwardly representative of Alzheimer’s lifewriting 
by children of parents with dementia, but because it offers an extreme 
version of the form of emotional violence to self and other that I 
identified at the beginning of this essay in Annie Ernaux’s account of her 
mother’s hospitalisation. It therefore encapsulates something I would 
argue we encounter in more latent or displaced forms in a range of less 
obviously distraught narrative accounts of parental loss. The novel traces 
the effects of Alzheimer’s disease upon a family. The mother, displaying 
the signs of early memory loss, becomes dependent upon her husband, 
who then collapses and dies from a heart attack. Her care falls into the 
hands of her sons—one a philosopher, the other a neuroscientist—who 
make the decision to sell up the family home and place her in an 
institution. Written in the first person from the perspective of the 
unnamed philosopher son, the narrative is prompted by his desire to 
“redeem” this experience and to reconnect with a sense of his mother 
prior to her illness:  
 
There must be some way back to unscarred beginnings, when she 
was in her painting clothes barefoot, sipping a beer, humming to 
                                                        
4For an account of the autobiographical content of the text and the rifts it caused in 
Ignatieff’s close family, see Lederman (2012).  
 
NARRATIVE WORKS 4(2)     40 
 
 
herself, happy and far away. That is how she should be 
remembered. That is what I must rescue from her dying, if such a 
thing can be done. (p. 1) 
 
Despite this statement of reparative intent, the narrative itself traces the 
dismantling of both his and his mother’s lives as a consequence of her 
disease. Unable to reconcile himself with his mother’s cognitive decline, 
he struggles to find meaning in her every gesture and in the verbal 
fragments that remain of her speech. Obsessively visiting her in the care 
home, he becomes consumed by the progress of her disease, eventually at 
the expense of his own marriage, and then of his job. Teaching a course 
on “Philosophy and Shakespeare,” he finds himself able only to teach 
King Lear, a text that he interprets not simply as a story of dementia but 
of the steady collapse of mutual recognition: 
 
Look, I would tell my class, the mad king at first does not 
recognise his daughter, because he does not recognise himself. I 
never saw a performance of the play which managed to express 
the relation between losing yourself and losing everyone else. I 
had to act it out for them myself, in the middle of the class: the 
way the king pats his own body, running his hand over the 
hospital garments they have put on him. I would be up there in the 
middle of a class of undergraduates, patting my old tweed jacket, 
running my hands across my own arms, and I would see them 
looking at me, as my children did after the break-up of my 
marriage, asking themselves: Who is this? Why is he like this? (p. 
164) 
 
His performance of Lear points to the extent of his own psychical 
disturbance in the face of his mother’s decline. The playing out of the role 
of the “mad king” suggests his own form of suffering as a kind of 
phantom dementia. This is borne out in the narrative of his progressive 
disconnection from the social worlds of his marriage, family, and job, a 
story that parallels that of the deracinating trajectory of his mother’s 
illness. Like her, he becomes increasingly isolated, lost in the fracturing 
logic of her cognitive decline. The last sections of the novel, following his 
mother’s death, see him holed up in his flat, spending his days seeking 
“oblivion” in daytime soaps and ads and his sleepless nights writing a 
“manic treatise” on selflessness (p. 180). He notes, “I didn’t go out, didn’t 
wash, looked at the world through the dusty, then rain-streaked windows 
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of this apartment, and felt the lunatic awareness and exaltation of the 
sleep deprived” (p. 179). His attempts to make sense of his mother’s 
illness manifest a kind of “entrapment,” as John Wiltshire (2000) puts it, 
in the crisis he seeks to understand (p. 419).  
This entrapment moves through various stages in the narrative, 
reflecting an increasingly pathological blurring of the boundaries between 
his identity and that of his mother. Early in the text, his sense of the crisis 
of identity that Alzheimer’s brings begins with a reflection upon the 
extent to which his mother’s memory acts as a kind of guarantee of his 
own life narratives: 
 
Sometimes at night, lying by her side, I think about all the 
memory that must remain inside her, trapped within the circuits, 
denied speech yet still present in her mind. She is the silent 
custodian of the shadow zone of my own life. She is the only one 
who can tell me what I was like before I began to remember, the 
only one who can decipher those first senseless scenes when 
memory begins. (p. 50) 
 
Here, the narrator simply acknowledges the intertwining of the story of 
his life with that of her own. Yet as his mother’s illness progresses, he 
becomes increasingly fixated on the question of where and whether these 
memories remain—as if the question of her personhood is inextricably 
tied to that of his own. This is played out through a range of visual 
metaphors in which her capacity to “see,” and thus to know him, is 
gradually diminished and broken up. Early in the text, the narrator tells 
the story of the time his mother painted a portrait of him as a teenager. He 
describes the finished painting as both that which enables him to see 
himself  “through her eyes” and that which takes him “about as deep into” 
himself as he is “ever likely to get” (p. 17). This passage foregrounds the 
extent to which his sense of self is contingent upon her recognition. I am 
reminded here of Mikhail Bakhtin’s (1990) description of inter-
subjectivity in which selfhood can only be fully realised through the 
mutual exchange of glances between self and other: “As we gaze at each 
other, two different worlds are reflected in the pupils of our eyes” (p. 
xxii). Ignatieff’s narrator requires his mother to “see” him in order fully 
to see himself. As her dementia progresses, he describes her failing 
cognitive powers and withdrawal from him in explicitly visual terms as 
the breaking up of his own reflection in her mind. In turn, her inability to 
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recall the whole of his image is experienced as the fracturing of his own 
identity and personal breakdown:  
 
By this stage, I was all in pieces inside her; name, face, texture of 
skin, shape of my eyes, all tumbling over and over in the darkness 
of her mind. Upon occasion, she could catch a piece of the broken 
mirror and hold it up long enough to know who I was. Then that 
shard would slip loose and sink back into shadows and she 
wouldn’t give a flicker of recognition … if she failed to recognise 
you, you ceased to exist. No longer her son, no longer anyone. 
Acknowledge that I exist. Acknowledge your son. (pp. 163-64) 
 
This sense of being broken up is replicated at the level of the 
narrative itself, in which the story is interrupted by various narrative 
fragments. These include his reading of King Lear, an analysis of Willem 
de Kooning, his own philosophical reflections upon selfhood contained in 
his “manic treatise,” a brief paragraph on Melanie Klein, a discussion of 
the case of Janet Adkins, and finally, a reflection upon the logic of 
neuroscientific models of subjectivity. In this manner, the psychical 
problems he experiences around his mother’s failure fully to recognise 
him are linked to an epistemological crisis around how we should “see” 
dementia. Through the text, the narrator’s philosophical disposition is 
contrasted with what his father describes as his brother’s “propositional” 
scientific intelligence. Whereas neuroscience provides his brother with a 
meaningful epistemological frame through which to make sense of her 
illness, the narrator struggles with the implications of his sense of 
Alzheimer’s as an “illness of selfhood.” This is rather ponderously 
explored in a range of fraught conversations between the two brothers and 
in a meeting with a neurologist in which each attempt the narrator makes 
to assert his mother’s personhood is rebutted with a clinical description: 
 
“Take the business about her language,” I say. “She can’t 
maintain a conversation, but the way she listens, and laughs when 
you say something that amuses her, nods to let you know she’s 
following what you say.” 
The doctor seems interested. “Her semantic and syntactic 
memory functions have collapsed, but prosodic variation is still 
intact.” (pp. 57-58) 
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To the extent that this exchange presents the doctor, and by implication 
medical discourse, as displaying what Tom Kitwood (1997) might 
describe as a “malignant” disregard of the person, the novel itself presents 
the narrator’s desire to preserve his mother’s personhood as a difficult 
and damaging choice, at least so far as his own sense of identity is 
concerned. His desire to understand her dementia and the crisis it 
precipitates is explicitly contrasted with the contained response of his 
brother: 
 
My brother isn’t bothered by what he doesn’t know. The 
answers will surrender themselves eventually. There is a serenity 
in his science which makes me envious and unhappy. “I wish I 
knew how to change my life,” I say. 
He acts as if he hasn’t heard and counts off on his fingers 
the things science will be able to do for this kind of patient one 
day: implantation of DNA to correct the genetic defect; chemicals 
to retard the production of protein; or chemicals to help the 
enzymes to break down and remove the protein; other chemicals 
to improve neurotransmitter function. Tragedy is thus transformed 
into a manageable condition. (p. 132) 
 
 “Does understanding anything,” he eventually asks, “make a difference, 
if there is nothing you can do to stop it happening?” (p. 197). 
The twin crises of recognition and of knowledge, of ways of 
seeing dementia and of failures to see, come together at the end of the text 
in an Oedipal moment of violent self-revelation. The narrator relates an 
anecdote about his attempt to pin a photograph of himself as a child on 
the notice board in his mother’s room: 
 
I wanted to pin this picture up on the bulletin board beside my 
mother’s bed. I had already laid the pin in the centre of the top 
margin of the picture when I placed the photo in her hand. She 
held it there for a second and stared carefully at this image of a 
child who was once her son. Then with sudden, savage 
deliberation, she removed the pin and jabbed at the picture, 
puncturing both of my eyes. 
 There was not a shadow of doubt as to what she intended. 
It had been a blinding. Now, of course, I understood. If you hold 
the picture up to the light, radiant illumination streams through the 
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eyes. It is the light streaming from the terrain beyond the gates of 
truth. (p. 198) 
  
This moment of understanding is one that speaks to the sublime 
and terrible impossibility of understanding, of what he describes as an 
encounter with “a pure and heartless reality beyond anything a living soul 
can possibly imagine” (p. 199). This is a reality that is literally 
unthinkable, a violent evacuation of meaning. At this point, his earlier 
recognition of his intersubjective bond with his mother, and of the 
intertwining of their stories and memories, collapses into a loss of all 
boundaries. By the end of the text, he not only identifies with, but seeks 
to devolve himself into his mother. Convinced he is in the early stages of 
dementia, he visits an old friend, Dr. L, for neurological tests: “I asked 
him to read the report and not spare me the details. When he finished, I 
said, ‘So it’s too early to tell.’ And he nodded and then he said, ‘You 
almost look disappointed’” (p. 192). 
Unable to find a way of living with the reality of his mother’s 
dementia, he ultimately seeks it out as a way of dying, and as an integral 
constituent of his identity. The text concludes with his walking out, bare 
footed, into the night: 
 
I will walk out to end of the railway line. I will listen to the 
Chatham freights. I will feel the night breeze on my face. I will 
hear the road just beyond the orchard. I will see the lights of Alton 
and hear voices beckon. I will see the car lights, streaming 
through the night. No one will stop me now. The good Dr. L. is 
mistaken. The scans are mistaken. The cells are too small to see. 
But I know, I feel them inside me. My fate has come to meet me. 
My voyage has begun. (p. 199) 
 
There are various ways in which this denouement can be read. There is 
something of Lear here in the barefooted journey into the night, and 
something, too, of the night wanderer, one of Alzheimer’s stock 
characters. Yet it also references the familiar conclusion of the male 
Bildungsroman, in which the hero flees the nets of social obligation, 
separating himself from the world of home and family that stand in the 
way of true self-realisation (always outside the bounds of the text, always 
outside the bonds of the family). Here, though, the narrator’s journey out 
of the city and away from the apartment that overlooks his mother’s care 
home is marked by the embracing of a way of death, a journey into the 
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heart of dementia. Self-realisation then comes with the recognition of the 
collapsing of his own story into that of his mother, a story of the 




Scar Tissue is, in many respects, a deeply self-indulgent text in its 
obsessive and prolonged exploration of the narrator’s cri de coeur in the 
face of his mother’s dementia. It is striking that his mother’s personhood 
is persistently effaced by the narrator’s focus upon his own crisis of 
identity; she effectively functions as a cipher or screen upon which he 
projects his own existential crisis. There are moments in the narrative that 
gesture towards other modes of response that fall between his brother’s 
Platonic rationality and his own psychological collapse: his wife 
encourages him “just to live,” and his mother’s nurse (with whom he has 
an affair) simply gets on with the job of caring for his mother’s practical 
and emotional needs. However, what the narrative brilliantly exposes is 
the way in which the narrator’s desire to sustain his mother’s identity is 
disturbed by her inability to recognise and thus to affirm his own sense of 
self. In this text, the consequences of the erosion of reciprocal or mutual 
recognition upon which the concept of intersubjectivity is founded is 
played out both masochistically and narcissistically; the narrator engages 
in increasingly self-destructive behaviours, culminating in the enactment 
of his own social death and isolation from friends and family.  
In works such as Annie Ernaux’s I Remain in Darkness, there is 
an explicit violence in the descriptive language she uses to convey her 
mother’s cognitive losses and decline. It is hard not to read this as an act 
of violence towards her mother for no longer being the mother she once 
was, but equally hard not to read it as a form of violence towards the self. 
This is evident in the passage with which I began, in which Ernaux 
compares her mother’s treatment in hospital to her own experience of 
abortion. In the context of the significance accorded to the concept of 
intersubjectivity within the personhood movement, what an engagement 
with these narratives indicates is the degree to which the task of 
sustaining another’s identity is problematized by the rupturing of mutual 
recognition as that which constitutes and supports narrative identity. The 
fact of intersubjectivity may be that which enables us to sustain 
personhood in dementia but it is also at the centre of the identity crises 
explored in many of these narratives. To acknowledge this is not to turn 
away from the task of telling another’s story, but it is to recognise that 
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such a task is more complex and potentially more difficult than a simple 
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